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NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from an equitable decision of the
lower court, denying plaintiff-appellants' application for an
extraordinary writ compelling the defendant Secretary of
State to certify the Human Rights Party as a political party
for the next ensuing election.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

After a hearing on May 8, 1972, the
plaintiff-appellants' application for extraordinary relief was
denied by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson. An amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law resulted from a
hearing on June 7, 1972, reaffirming the denial of
extraordinary relief and determining that the signature
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distriln1tion _requirement of Section 20-3-2, U.C.A. (1953).
w~s "not void uy rc;ison of the equal protection clauses of
the State and Federal constitutions."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The respondent seeks a ruling of this Court
sustaining the judgm~nt of the lower court as being within it~
sound discretion and 1n accordance with law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent accepts as substantially correct the
Statement of Facts as it appears in the appellants' brief,
except for the few matters hereinafter stated by way of
amendment or clarification.
While the party organizers submitted over 800
signatures, the required certification of signatures by clerks
of the various counties showed only 501 of the signers to be
registered voters as required by the statute.
Pl;iintiff-appellants stipulated that they could have complied
with the ten-county, ten-signature requirement had they
made the effort.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO STANDING
TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE SUBJECT STATUTES.

It is not evident from reading the court's opinion that
the defendants in Moore v. Ogilvie 394 U.S. 814 89 S. Ct.
1493, 23 L. Ed. 1(1969), raised the question of standing.
However, Justice Stewart in his dissent stated, "There is
absolutely no indication in the record that appellants could
not, if they had made the effort, have easiiy satisfied Illinois'
fifty-county, two hundred signature requirement". (Supra at
820, 821 ). Here, however, the state official defendant has
raised the issue of plaintiff's standing and on that point the
stipulation of the parties states: "Petitioners could have

o!Jtairwd sufficient additional sign<Jtures to qualify as an
rmlcpcncle11t p<1rty under the. aforesaid law if they have
endeavored W do so after learnmg_t~Jt the members living in
those counties who s1~1ned the pet1t1on were not qualified to
sign it" (paragraph 14 on page 4 of the Stipulation).
POINT II
THIS CASE CAN, AND SHOULD, BE DECIDED
UPON NONCONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS.

The case involving the same issues filed by the party
plain tiff in the state court was decided upon a
nonconstitutional basis, namely that the plaintiffs there did
not have standing to challenge the subject statute because
they did not make the effort referred to in Point 11 above
(Human Rights Party and Montague v. Miller, Salt Lake
County No. 205449).
Another nonconstitutional basis on which the state
court might decide this case would be on the basis that
obtaining nine qualified signatures in the 10th county was
substantial comr:iliance with the law in question. Such a
contention under somewhat similar facts was successful in
the case of O'Donnell v. Ryan, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 885, affirmed
in 13 N. Y. 2d 885.
Although no case sufficiently identical on its facts has
been found to be dispositive on the instant case, the principle
that cases will not be decided on constitutional grounds
unless it is unavoidable is well established. Professor Antleau
wrote on this point in Modern Constitutional Law, (Vol. 2),
as follows:
Sec. 15:33: The United States Supreme Court has
often announced that it will not decide constitutional
issues unless doing so is unavoidable. Rosenberg v.
F/euti (1963) 374 U.S. 449, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 83 S.
Ct. 1804. It said, for instance, in 1952: "This Court
will not pass upon the constitutionality of an act of
Congress ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable.
. . . " United States v. Hayman (1952) 342 U.S. 2.05,
96 L. Ed. 232, 244, 72 S. Ct. 263. The same judicial
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allstinencc custon:arily prevails with reference to acts
of the stote lc~g1sloture5, as well as to executive
dee isions and procedures at trial. "Constitutional
adjudication should where possible be avoided," says
the court. NAACP v. Alabama (1958) 357 US 449
2L Ed 2d 1488, 1497, 78SCt1163.
'
The Supreme Court avoids constitutional issues
frequently by deciding cases on nonconstitutional
grounds, rather than on the claims of
unconstitutionality. Communist Party of United
States v. Subversive Activities Control Board ( 1956)
351 US 115, 100 L Ed 1003, 76 S Ct 663. For
example, in 1948, the court decided that judicial
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in the
District of Columbia violated national public policy,
rather than the Fifth Amendment. Said the court: "It
is a well settled principle that this court will not
decide constitutional questions where other grounds
are available and dispositive of the issues of the case."
Hurd v. Hodge ( 1948) 334 US 24, 92 L Ed 1i87, 68
S Ct 847. The supreme Court will, if possible, decide
cases on nonconstitutional grounds even when such
grounds were not raised by the parties. Neese v.
Southern R. Co. (1955) 350 US 77, 100 L Ed 60, 76
S Ct 131.
Another way the Supreme Court avoids
constitutional adjudication.is by giving a construction
to legislative acts that will avoid doubts as -to their
constitutionality. Where a statute is susceptible of
multiple constructions, the court will give the statute
that construction which avoids determining that it is
unconstitutional. United States v. CIO (1948) 335 US
106, 92 L Ed 1849, 68 S Ct 1349; Schneider v. Smith
(1968) 390 US 17, 19 L Ed 2d 799, 88 S Ct 682;
United States v. Rumely ( 1953) 345 US 41, 97 L Ed
770, 73 S Ct 543; United v. Witkovich (1957) 353 US
194, 1 L Ed 2d 765, 77 S Ct 779. In 1936, Justice
Brandeis remarked:
"When the validity of an act· of the Congress is
drawn in question, and even, if a serious d~ub~ of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal pnnc1ple
that this Court will first ascertain whether a
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lallCI grounds, l:owcvPr, have not figured significantly in
coses raised 1n this areo_ and ore ~ot relevant to this inquiry.
The only case depending on First Amendment support is
Williams v. Rhoe/cs, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S. Ct. 5, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24
(1968), which overturned Ohio's new party requirement
because of its excessive burden on new parties. However the
cases of Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 2J L.
Ed. 2d 1 ( 1969) and Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 s.
Ct. 1970 (1971), respectively ignore or dismiss First
Amendment challenges to signature requirements for new
parties. Utah's requirement is less burdensome than those in
Moore and Jenness. It also is free of other harsh requirements
imposed by Ohio, which were invalidated in Williams. The
First Amendment claim is not well taken. Essentially,
plaintiffs' case must rise or fall with their equal protection
logic.
In order to determine which equal protection test or
measure to apply, a determination must first be made as to
what specific rights are involved. The problem is that the
specific rights here involved are not clearly defined. "The
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend
themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates
always have at least some theoretical correlative effect on
voters," Bullock v. Carter, 92 S. Ct. 849, 856 (1972). The
same may be said of the rights of political parties, that those
rights "do not lend themselves to neat separation" from the
closely analogous rights of voters and candidates. Therefore,
there is the dual problem of identifying which rights are
directly involved and also what are the distinctions and
perimeters of those rights. There appear to be three distinct
groups of election rights potentially involved. They are: the
right to vote; the right to seek (run for) public office, and the
right of political organizations to gain ballot recognition as a
political "party."
Only one of the enumerated rights, i.e. the right to
vote, is denominated a "fundamental right." Harper v.
Virginia Board of Education, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079,
16 L. Ed. 2d 169 ( 1966), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84
S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 ( 1964). The other two rights,
i.e. the right of candidates to run for office and the right of
an organized group of voters to obtain a ballot position,
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wllilt! 1 eco~J11ized as serious and important, have never been
held to be "fundamental." Since the recognition of a right as
"fundamental;: requires the ap~lic~tion of ~he ."compelling
state 111tErest test to det?rmine its const1tut1onality, the
interrelation b.etw.ee1~ the ngh.t to vote and party qualifying
requirements 1s s1gn1f1cant. S~nc~ Moore v. Ogilvie, Supra,
which struck down an I lllno1s distributional signature
requirement for new parties, used the "one man, one vote"
logic from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L.
Ed. 2d 663 ( 1962) and Reynolds to justify that decision, it
thereby concomitantly involves the right to vote. The extent
to which the rights of voters were pivotal in Moore is not
clear, and Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, at no
point invokes the "fundamental right-compelling state
interest" test, which wou Id be expected if the court
considered it a voting right infringement. It remains
therefore, to consider which test shou Id be applied and what
the result of that application ought to be.
The court, in Williams v. Rhodes, supra, in a case
striking down Ohio's party qualification requirement of a
15% voter petition, neither applied nor established a rigid
standard, but rather noted:
'In determining whether or not a state law
violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must
consider the facts and circumstances behind the law,
the interests which the State claims to be protecting,
and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by
the classification." Supra at 29.
This case-by-case approach sanctioned in Williams illuminates
the failure of Moore to identify one single test to be applied.
Moore is evidence of the Williams notion of individual
scrutiny leading to an appropriate equal protection test. Not
only does this suggest that the "compelling state interest"
test is inappropriate in this species of election cases, but the
court in February of this year appears to have created a new
equal protection test in Bullock v. Carter, supra, a case
striking down a Texas filing fee requirement for candidates.
Therefore, an application of the Bullock standard to Sec.
20-3-2(g)(2) follows, prefaced by a discussion of the "one
man, one vote" principle as applied in Moore.
7

Juslice DoLHJlas in vvriti11q for the rrnijority in Moore
un:iloqizccJ to the "one rnan, one vote" standards of the
apportio11rncnl cases;, Moor~ was. the first such application of
"one man, one vote principles 1n a non-representation area
and it is not yet ccnain what specific standards are imparted
!JV thilt a11alo~1y. Ne1th.er ~he language of that decision nor
any subsequent appl 1catron has defined the numerical
standards to be applied. Eliminating all other possible
interpretations of the import of that analogy by logic, the
Court's intention was most likely either that the standards of
the apportionment cases by exactingly transplanted into the
area of party qualification requirements or that the "one
man, one vote" standards established in the area of
reapportionment be generally and reasonably applied relative
~o this unique and different area.
The Moore court intimates that an opposite holding
would be "out of line with our recent apportionment cases,"
indicriting at least some relationship to those "one man, one
vote" standards. However, the concluding sentences of
Justice Douglas' orinion reveal the basis of the standard. • ·
"This law thus discriminates against the residents of the
populous counties of th8 State in favor of rural sections. It,
therefore, lacks the equality to which the exercise of political
rights is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment."
(emphasis added). Moore v. Ogilvie, supra, at 819. The
meaning of equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in any given circumstance has always reflected
the peculiar rights involved. Hence, when Justice Douglas
submerged the analogue of the "one man, one vote"
principles of aprortionment cases in the "equality" standards
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the resulting standard differs
from the strict "one man, one vote" measure of the
apportionment cases. Moore produces an equal protection
standard given additional definition by the "one man, one
vote" principles of the apportionment cases. Logically, as
you expand the application of a standard by analogy, its
limits necessarily expand and take the shape of the modified
subject. That is, when the object of a defining standard
changes, the definitional limits of that standard change
accordingly. The principles represented by the "one man, one
vote" language in Moore should therefore be defined in light
of this less fundamental election activity, i.e. qualifying
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ielitions, and co11structed liberally. That does not dissipate
l
the "one rnan, 011c vote " a11a.Iogy, IJut rather is in keeping
with the nature of the electron activity it measures. The
application of stricter standJrds in apportionment cases in
which voters are unequally represented is deserved. But here
vvhci-e the issue is a distributional petition requirement fo;
party recognition, where neither "votes" nor "voters" are
directly involved, the standards should be more liberally
construed in a way judiciously proportional to the rights
involved, and in keeping with whatever equal protection test
is appropriate.
The "logic gap" created by the use of the analogy of
the apportionment cases to a case involving a party
qualification requirement is adequately bridged by the
language ir. Moore. However, the need for liberal
construction of "one man, one vote" principl-es is illustrated
by the distinctions between the two analogues.
First, in apportionment cases, the questioned
distribution is fixed and the inequality is certain. In those
cases, there cannot exist equality of representation until a
statutory change occurs. Such is not the case with Utah's
signature distribution requirement, which can in many
different instances be found to be constitutionally
satisfactory. It is not certain that the distribution of
signatures resultant from the particular schematic design of
the party's signature drive will be violative of the "equality"
demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment and, as will be
demonstrated below, it is more common to find a rough
equality.
Second, the reapportionment cases, specifically Baker
and Reynolds, involve the under and over-representation of
groups of voters. However, in these party qualification,
voter-petition statutes, in Justice Stewart's words neither
"votes" nor "voters" are involved. That is not to say that a
party qualification requirement is not related to voting rights,
but neither Moore nor this case involve voting rights or other
rights denominated fundamental. Rather, the Utah statute
regulates activities preparatory to the election--important but
not fundamental.
Third, in the apportionment cases, every voter in a
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narticiil<1r g1~ogrophic>il unit h<is his vote effected. When an
~ipportio11111c11t scheme is v(iolative of constitutional
stJndar ds, a certd 1n group or groups) of voters are
under-represented and the remaining voters, are
over represented. However, in the party qualification
requirement embodied _in Sec. 20-3-2(g)(2), only the very few
registered voters C!re d 1rectly effecte who sign the petitions.
Hence, it cann?t
determined until after the party
organization has 1dent1f1ed supporters willing and qualified to
sign the petition wh8ther there is a violation of the
"equality" ririnciples of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
freedom Cl potential party has in determining the distribution
of its 500 signatures suspends any judgment on the equality
of signature worth until the distribution can be individually
appraised. To prove Constitutional inequality, inequality
must exist. Since only 501 registered voters signed the
petition (one more than the requisite number). no group of
qualified supporters are shown to have been denied equal
protection rights by virtue of the distribution requirement.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any violation of the
principles of the equal protection clause here.

b:.

Justice Douglas, in the Moore case, cites Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, as illustrative of the application of the
equal protection standards of the Fourteenth Amendment to
"one man, one vote" cases. Therefore, the value ratio
(disµacity) of votes in Gray sheds some light on the
comparative ratios here. In Gray, the value ratio of votes
between under and over-represented geographical units
ranged from 8 to 1 to 14 to 1. That disparity clearly violates
the notions of "equality" in the Fourteenth Amendment. As
well, the discrepancy in the Gray case is from five to nine
times as high as the ratios in this case. The differences
between the disfavored 1llinois requirement and the present
Utah requirement are a!so substantial in terms of a "one man,
one vote" analysis. (See Appendix I for statistical analysis.)
By determining optimum signature distribution among the
requisite number of counties and then contrasting the
statistical value of a signature in the least populous county
with the statistical value of a signature in the middle and
greater populated counties, it is possible to determine a value
ratio reflecting the variation from a strict "one man, one
vote" measure. In Illinois, the ratio of signature value
between the least populous county required by the statute
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(the filtir~th moc.t popt1lcitcd cou11ty)
countit~s commonly indicates a ratio

and the more populous
of about 3.8 to 1. That
is a sigr1dturc of a registered voter in the fiftieth most
p~pulatr.d county in lllin.ois has 3.8 times as much impact
(value) as that of a registered voter in one of the more
populous counties. In Utah, on the other hand, using the
signulurc value of the tenth most populated county, the ratio
is approximately 1.6 to 1. Moreover, in Utah if the party
movement is essentially based in one of the large counties, a
nearly equal "one man, one vote" ratio exists between the
first and tenth counties. (For example, if Salt Lake County
provided 410 of the requisite 500 signatures, the value of a
signature in Salt Lake County would be essentially equivalent
to the value of a signature in the tenth most populated
county.) It is clear that the variance in the Utah statute is
very much le:;s than that of the abolished Illinois requirement
or any other disfavored statute. The question remains
whether the disproportion of the Utah requirement is
sufficient of itself to justify its judicial exclusion. Where "one
man, one vote" principles are liberally applied, as here in a
petition situation, a 1.6 to 1 ratio is within reason. Since it is
probable that the main focus of a political organizational
movement in Utah will be in one or two of the more
populous counties as in this case, the fact that a
mathematical equaiity results in such a situation is additional
justification for the subject statute. Therefore, while Utah's
voter petition requirement for party recognition is capable of
some disparity in signature value between lesser and greater
populated counties, its substantial difference from the Illinois
formula and the frequent equality in typical new party
development satisfy the "one man, one vote" principles of
Moore.

The Utah requirement is therefore not inherently
violative of the "equality" required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nor have plaintiffs demonstrated here that
Utah's requirement has constitutionally impermissible
unequal impact on different groups of registered voters. It is
important for the court to establish standards appropriate to
the rights and state interests involved. Justice Holmes warned
against rigidity in standards in this area, when he pointed out
that, it "is important for this court to avoid extracting from
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yc11cral languoCJe of the Fourteenth Amendment a
Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Barber Asphalt Co., 197 U.S. 430, 434 25 S. Ct. 466, 49 L.
Ed. 819 (190'1) (Holmes, J.). Imposing numerical standards
which would invalidate Utah's requirement would not be in
kccpiny with the spirit and principle of the equal protection
clause and would extend the "one man, one vote" analogy to
a logical absurdity.
till' Vl'IY

~ystem of dcli1sive exactness .... "

The "one man, one vote" standard was only part of
the analysis which the court went through in Moore, and it
remains to ascertain which equal protection test ought to
apply. Moore did not find all voter petition distribution
requirements unconstitutional per se. Therefore, to strike
down the Utah requirement without consideration of its
reasonableness or the "reasonable necessity" of the
requirement to the accomplishment of legitimate state
interests would be an unwarranted extension of the Moore
holding. Moreover, since Moore did not pronounce the right
of political parties to ballot position "fundamental," the
"fundamental right-compelling state interest" test is
inappropriate. Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion. in the
ori~1inal heJring before the single judge court, Williams v.
Rhur!cs does not stand for the application of the "compelling
state interest" test in this equal protection area. Rather,
Williams holds that when the burden placed on ballot
recognition of new parties is so great as to seriously restrict
the First Amendment rights of free association, then a
"compelling state interest" test applies. But Williams does
not apply that test to the equal protection issues raised,
instead suggesting the case-by-case scrutiny pointed out
above. Even if a "compelling state interest" test were to be
applied, Sec. 20-3-2(g) (2) would not automatically be
invalidated, as there are several recent election cases
recognizing "compelling state interests." Bendiger v. Ogilvie,
335 F. Supp. 572 (1971), Jackson v. Ogilvie, 325 F. Supp.
864 (1971).

While the "fundamental right-compelling state
interest" test is neither requisite nor appropriate for the
disposition of this case the traditional "rational relationship"
test is weak and als~ ill-suited for the protection of the
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i:i:l'('rtc111l 1iql1ls here in question. To circumvent the
t!ilcrntiia of deciding between these two polarized and
ricittlified tests and to avoid the uncertainty of awaiting a
rlcfinition of rights as fundamental, the Supreme Court
recently esti:iblished a new test for the evaluation and
s;ifcgumd of cqllal . protection rights. Speaking for a
un;itiimous court, Chief Justice Burger, in Bullock v. Carter
struck clown a Texas filing fee requirement system, creatin~
and using a "reJsonable necessity" test. This test, as applied
to Sec. 20 3-2(g)(2) is essentially three-phase: is the
distributionul requirement reasonable, are there legitimate
state interests involved, and is the distributional requirement
reasonably 11ecessary for the accomplishment of the state
inte1-ests. This test provides the courts with a flexible
practical and realistic method of evaluating both individuai
rights and stilte interests. An analysis of Sec. 20-3-2(g)(2)
under this "reasonable necessity" test is dispositive of the
constitutional validity and function of the Utah requirement.
In considering the reasonableness of the Utah
requirement ( 500 signatures of registered voters including at
least ten registered voters from each of ten counties) a
comparison with similar requirements of other states has
considerable merit. There are two integral parts of the
distributional requirement: the number of signatures required
and the requisite distribution of signatures. A high signature
quota sans distributional requirement is no more reasonable
than a low signature requirement with a minimal
distributional qualification. The Illinois distribution
requirement invalidated in Moore required 25,000 signatures
with at least 200 signatures each from 50 of the 103
counties. On a proportional basis, the Illinois signature
requirement is five times as high as Utah's and the per county
requirement is nearly eight times as high. In the Ohio case of
Williams v. Rhodes, 15% of the total vote for governor in the
previous election was the numerical requirement for a new
party petition. The Ohio requirement was invalidated on
several grounds, particularly the violation of equal protection
rights, since the existing parties needed to poll only 10% in
the preceeding election. It appears that in Williams the court
implicitly ruled that a 15% signature requirement, coupled
with a number of other harsh requirements, was too great a
burden on First Amendment and equal protection rights.
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However, in Je!111css \:. rortso11, 403 U.S. 431, 91 s. Ct.
1
1970, 29 L. bl. 2d :.J,)"1
( 1971 ), the court found CJ 5%
siuiidture requirement .tor new parties neither violative of
rqual rrotect1011 nor First Amendment riqhts. In a footnote,
the Williams court po111ted out that 42 of the stiltes
including Ut;ih, have a 1% or smaller voter petitio~
requirement for new parties, and none of these state statutes
have been judicially overturned.
From the comparative posture above, one moves to a
closer scrutiny of the UtCJh requirement itself. To obtain a
position on the ballot, an aspiring party must secure the
signatures of 500 registered voters with a minimum of ten
signatures from ten different counties. For an existing party
to remain on the ballot, it must "poll for any of its
candidates equivalent to two per cent of this total vote cast
for illl representatives in Congress." Sec. 20-3-2(g)(1), U.C.A.
1953. This would amount in 1972, to 7,462 votes (or
signatures). An embryo political party in Utah is faced with
significantly less stringent ballot requirements than an
es1ablished rarty, amounting to a voter-count differential of
6,962 (7,462 less the 500 now required).
In weighing the reasonableness of the Utah
requirement, a pragmatic view is essential. Neither the
number of counties (10 of 27) nor the number of signatures
per county ( 10) required by Utah statute can be considered
burdensome. Rather, the numerical qualifications are so
minimal as to be almost non-existent. The question more
nearly appropriate is why Utah would impose such minimal
requirements in the first place, since they require so little to
be met. The reasons for the minimal distributional
requirement, created by the 1969 amendment to Sec.
20-3-2(g)(2), are the prevention of voter confusion,
administrative efficiency, prevention of the waste of public
monies, the protection of the integrity of the election
process, and the minimal ratification of political movements
to state voters, more fully discussed below.
Another consideration is the framework within which
Utah can constitutionally establish new party qualifications.
It would be constitutionally permissible for the legislature to
change the voter petition requirement for new parties upward
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dS !)'){,, u11clc1 the Jenness holdiiig, dmounting to
s1911dtllrcs. It IS oliv1ous that a 5% signature
rl'qllircn1ent, or evc11 o~e of 2%, is a greater burden on a
!lr.dqliil(J riarty than 1s the 500 signature, ten-county
tcri s i911ature rcqu 1rernent presently status in Utah.
ThcrPforc, Sec. 203-2(g)(2) is neither equivalent to those
disti ibutional schemes struck down by various courts nor is it
urire<ison;ibly arbitrary in and of itself. It is an attempt by the
legislJture to establish a minimum level or standard of
Jctivity 1ustifying ballot recognition. That the legislature has
optt.?d for a requirement of significantly fewer signatures plus
the minimal distributional requirement is evidence of
thouqhtful and less burdensome alternative to a high
signature requ irernent.

dS

hirih

w.r;~S

The second phase of the Bullock test is the legitimacy
of the stdte interests involved. There is a logical presumption
in a legislative act, increasing with the chronological
proximity of enactment, that the legislature is acknowledging
and articulating a specific state interest. The presumption is
not conclusive but is at least evidence that the legislature
believed there were legitimate state interests represented.
That Sec. 20-3-2( g) (2) was amended in 1969 to include the
ten-counly ten-vote requirement indicates that this
qualification is not an anachronistic vestige of less progressive
time, but rather a recent modification reflecting a legislative
attempt to improve the party qualification requirement.
Essentially, the state interests represented by the
distributional requirement focus around the preservation of
the integrity of the election process. "There is surely an
important state interest in requiring some preliminary
showing of a significant modicum of support before printing
the name of a political organization's candidate on the
ballot--the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion,
deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at
the general election." Jenness v. Fortson, supra, at 442. The
facets of the state interest are therefore preclusion of voter
co11fusion, administrative efficiency, public awareness of new
political movements, and the prevention of the waste of
public monies. Courts have recognized state interests in
regulating elections, imposing minimum requirements ~or
candidates and parties to obtain ballot positions, controlling
the size of ballots, and in keeping frivolous or fraudulent
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,111d pa1tiPs uff the Lx1llot. See Jenness v. Fortson
supra, IJ!L'lhe1inq1011 v. Adams, 3oq F. Supp. 318 (1970),
fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592 (1970), Bodner v. Grav:
129 So. 7d 419, 89 A.L.R. 2d 860 (1961), New Mexico v.
Florina, 40 L.W. 2713 (1972). As well, the state hJs an
·1terest 111 requiring a "party" to give minimal "notice" to
j1
rnore than a local area of the state. This is not the
"state-wide" support notion which Moore seemed to
discount as i.l valid interest. The Utah statute requires neither
"state-1vide" participation nor "support" in the full sense of
the word. Ten signatures in ten counties is more nearly a
"qood faith" requirement of effort than a demonstration of
"~tate-wide support." The objective is not to have 90
supporters in nine counties other than the central county,
but to have more than a one-county focus.
i:;incliiLi!r•'.;

This distinction between the single county focus and
a state-wide focus can be seen in two ways. First, if a party is
interested in nominating candidates for offices within a
one-county scope, the alternative of fi Iing as independent
candidates u 11der Sec. 20-3-38, U.C.A. 1953, is provided.
Under this provision, independent candidates can give a five
word description of their position, and all the candidates
identifying with this cause could list themselves as the
"Human Rights Coalition" and advertise accordingly.
Therefore, an independent candidate representing a particular
ideology and constituency can obtain a ballot position with
300 signatures, 200 less than an independent party. Second,
if a party with local focus desires to nominate a candidate for
a state-wide or national office, the legislature has mandated
that that party extend their operations to at least nine other
counties to merit the benefits which accompany recognition
as a party (the opportunity of securing ballot representation
for the subsequent election and the right to nominate
candidates with out submitting voter petitions for each).
These two benefits given to qualified independent parties by
the state are the only rationale for a group seeking
recognition as a party rather than pursuing the independent
candidate process. By running candidates under the
independent candidate procedure rather than as an
independent party, a group would lose no rights or oth~r
benefits. While the party identification would appear !n
different places (above the candidate's name for parties and
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iiclnw 1lw c,rndidatr:'s mmr: for i11dcpcncJe11t caridid;ites), the
;iiiilrty tu iidvcrtr:;t' for 11w party collectively, to prepare a
platior rn and have c?mrnon positions, to associate and
paiticipcitc 111 .the elc~tron as a group, and as a public vehicle
for political ideas, 111 short, every activity essential to a
political party would be available to the party nominating
cariditJatcs through Sec. 20-3-38, U.C.A. 1953. To earn ballot
recognition as a "party,''. a potential party must "notify" a
srnattcri11~1 of people rn a scattering of counties and
demonstrate good faith by making party efforts beyond a
local activity. Therefore, the state has an interest in
rnaintJi 11 ing the proper u ti Iization of the different procedures
for independents to gain ballot position--those of local
concentration using the independent candidate process (Sec.
20 3-38) and those of state-wide concern using the
independent pMty process (Sec. 20-3-2(g)(2)). The resulting
design comports with the goals of voter understanding and
awareness and efficient administration. It should be noted
that such legislative alternatives for independent candidates
was not available under the Illinois statutory scheme
invalidated in Moore.
The motion of minimal "notice" to voters
throughout the state through the ten-county ten-signature
requir21nent is crucial to the state interests. Without
minimum notice to voters outside of the local focus of the
party, neither support nor opposition can be mustered. While
support from voters throughout the state is an obvious
consequence of the requirement, a more important objective
is the notification, at least to a small degree, of those who
would want to oppose the success of the emerging party and
its candidates. This right of opposition congenital to the
election process of necessity requires early notification. While
notice of a party's candidates will eventually reach all
communities, the early opposition citizens might wish to
initiate would be effectively undercut by the ability of a
party to quitely, even privately, organize through completely
locul procedures. The requirements reflect the policy
(expressed by the sponsor of the 1969 amendment to Sec.
20-3-2(g)(2)) that a party ought to merit "party" standing,
ought to do more than "holding one meeting." The whole
notion of "party" pragmatically connotes the sort of
operations minimally required under Sec. 20-3-2(g)(2) and
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tiw iriti'rc:;t·; uf citi1cns, both those supporting and opposed,
pr otccU'd hy 1111111 ma I no trf 1cat1on requirements.

Jrtc

Thr fined phase of the Bullock test is that Sec.
70 3-2(q)(2) "rnust be closely scrutinized and found
rf'Jsona/Jly necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate
state objectivr:s in order to pass constitutional muster."
Bullock v. Carter, supra, a.t 856. In this balancing, weighing
test, tile statute and state interests are relatively balanced. A
statutory requirement which is arbitrary or rigid requires a
showing of stronger state interests (ultimately up to a
showing of a "compelling state interest") and a less
burdensorne qualification can be justified by a weaker state
interest. Under th is lest of "reasonable necessity", the state
need not show a "compelling state interest", but only a
leciitirnate interest sufficient to justify the minimal
requirements of Sec. 20-3-2( g)( 2). Both the reasonableness of
the Utah requirement and the existence and validity of the
State interests involved are plotted above. Since
distributional requirements are not unconstitutional per se,
the h11rcJer1 on this court is to decide whether any such
requirc111ent with a distributional provision of "kinder"
proportions than Sec. 20-3-2(g)(2). Moreover, the court must
also clecide whether "distribution" is the evil, or whether,
viewing the statute "as a whole," it unreasonably or
arbitrarily or unequally prevents new parties from securing
ballot positions. A mechanistic approach without regard for
the purposes and needs of Utah's election system would be
injurious and self-defeating. The alternative to Utah's present
system is a higher signature requirement which could
constitutionally be vastly more burdensome. The present
qualifying procedure is not only reasonable, but is also
reasonably necessary to accomplish the important state
interests involved.

CONCLUSION
Therefore, the respondent respectfully urges the
Court to sustain the lower court's ruling and uphold the
constitutionality of the distributional signature requirement
of Ser.tion 20-3-2 U.C.A. (1953) on the basis of t~e
"reasonoble necessity" test of the equal protection clause.
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236
71
65
51
22
14
11

10
10
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.000515
.000515
.000515
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.0005]9
.000498
.000511
.000639
.000732
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1: 1. 53
l: 1. 53
l: 1. 53
1: 1. 52
1:1. 58
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l: 1. 23
l: 1. 08
1:1

ILLINOIS
POPUINI'ION

1 5,492,369

2

3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

491,882
382,638
285, 176
251,005
250,934
249,'198
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195,318
166,734
163,281
161,335
125,010
118,649
111, 555
111,409
104,389
97,250
97,045
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70,861
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61,280
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NO. OF OF SINGLE RATIO
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52. 9 ll3'14
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3.6 790
2.7 589
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2.4 519
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1.8 404
1.6 344
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216
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.6 200
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.003180
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